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Abstract 
In the years since communism’s collapse, several Central and East European 
countries have embarked on a “second” transition to extricate themselves from 
repressive rule by a postcommunist successor regime. In each case, reformers swept 
into power promising to improve governance and to introduce genuine democratic 
reforms. Yet second transitions, too, show significant variation in the speed and extent 
to which they are able to deliver these outcomes. This paper examines why this is the 
case. The analysis focuses exclusively on democratization in second transitions. It 
develops and advances the argument that the experience of postcommunist 
authoritarianism yields unique institutional and behavioral legacies that make the 
transition from postcommunist authoritarianism qualitatively different and constitute an 
additional obstacle to democratization in this context. It tests this hypothesis using the 
cases of Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia and confirms a correlation between each 
country’s qualitative experience under postcommunist authoritarianism and its reform 
government’s ability to lock in democratic gains.   
 7 
1. Introduction 
When communism collapsed in Europe in 1989, the change was hailed as a 
triumph of freedom and the emerging regimes were invariably described as in 
transition “to democracy.” Almost two decades later, it is clear that the outcomes of 
these transitions have only sometimes been democratic.1 In parts of Eastern Europe 
and most of the former Soviet Union, the overthrow of the communist dictatorship 
instead yielded a new form of authoritarian rule. Many such regimes remain intact 
today. But not all postcommunist authoritarian regimes have proven so stable: After a 
period of several years, some of these countries successfully overthrew the non-
democratic regime and embarked on a “second transition.” The hopeful expectation 
was that perhaps this time it would lead to democracy. Cases where this happened 
include Bulgaria (1996), Romania (1997), Slovakia (1998), Croatia (2000), Serbia 
(2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and possibly Kyrgyzstan (2005). Using a 
subset of these cases, this paper explores the specifics of democratization in such a 
context and the extent to which the in-between years of authoritarian rule affect 
political developments once the illiberal regime has been removed from power.  
Just as before, the second transition breakthroughs were greeted with euphoria 
and celebrated as “reborn”2 transitions to democracy. And with good reason: Each 
second transition brought to power a government of reformers pledging to make good 
on their predecessors’ unfulfilled promises of democracy.3 In both the high-profile, 
mass “revolutions” that challenged stolen elections in Serbia, Georgia, or Ukraine, and 
the less contentious, but equally significant electoral turnovers that took place in 
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, or Croatia, second transitions in the postcommunist 
world have hinged on elections that bring liberalizing elites to power. This is an 
important observation, both because it gives second transitions a common starting 
point and because it enables the assumption that those who take office in second 
transitions do so with the intention of establishing democracy. The phrase “second 
transition” thus describes a successful liberalizing opening and implies a second 
chance at completing the transition to democracy. 
In another parallel to the initial transitions, however, the outcomes of second 
transitions have not always lived up to expectations either. A quick glance around the 
                                                 
1
 Carothers 2002; McFaul 2002: 212 
2
 Pridham 2001: 65 
3
 Bunce/Wolchik 2006: 5 
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region, particularly to cases like Serbia or Ukraine, confirms this observation. 
Furthermore, even where reform momentum is sustained beyond the initial 
breakthrough, democratization varies in speed and degrees of success achieved 
across cases of second transition. It is probably too soon to speak of "democratic 
consolidation"4 in a formal sense, as liberalizing events in some places occurred only 
recently. Nevertheless, the stalled democratic processes observable in some 
instances of second transition call for explanation. Why, despite bringing democratic 
reformers to power, do second transitions achieve different levels of democratic 
gains? 
Guided by the observation that second transitions produce divergent outcomes, 
this paper seeks to account for that divergence by exploring a subset of three cases: 
Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia. Taking the second democratic breakthrough as a 
starting point, the analysis explores the course of events once the illiberal regime has 
been removed and liberalizers take over the task of governing. I hypothesize that the 
democratic gains they achieve are necessarily a product of factors present in the 
international and domestic environments. Like in the initial transitions, external 
support, particularly from the European Union, can be expected to establish incentives 
that reinforce the new government’s reform efforts. But on the domestic front, the 
reformers leading second transitions face a unique challenge in the form of 
postcommunist authoritarianism’s distinctive institutional and behavioral legacies. By 
treating transitions from postcommunist authoritarianism as a distinct phenomenon, 
the analysis attempts to shed light on a unique set of processes currently underway in 
Southeast and Eastern Europe. 
The cases of Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia reflect important differences both in 
the nature of their relationship with the EU and in their qualitative experiences with 
postcommunist authoritarianism. In addition to clear variation on both variables, 
enough time has passed since each country’s second breakthrough moment to allow 
a clear picture to emerge. The outcomes of course are not final, but the difference in 
their trajectories is striking: Slovakia achieved very strong and rapid gains; Croatia’s 
gains, though considerable, have been a bit weaker; Serbia has also democratized, 
but is now stalled or stalling on the path to reform. Taken together, this suggests that a 
comparative study could yield insights into the character and potential legacies of 
                                                 
4
 Linz/Stepan 1996; see discussion in Chapter 2 
 9 
postcommunist authoritarianism, along with the dynamics of their interaction with the 
external pull factor of the EU.  
The paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 sets up the study by providing 
some preliminary definitions and introducing the dependent variable, defined as 
democratic gains in second transitions. Chapter 3 presents insights from 
democratization theory and clarifies some of the main assumptions of the argument 
that will be presented here. Chapter 4 develops the paper’s theoretical framework 
further and puts the independent variables and hypotheses in context. In these 
chapters, the argument is developed broadly so that it might be generalizable across 
cases of second transition. The chapters that follow test the argument’s plausibility by 
applying it to the cases of Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia. Chapter 5 begins the 
empirical analysis by comparatively evaluating each country’s experience with 
postcommunist authoritarianism. Chapter 6 then assesses the degree to which the 
European Union has been present in each case. As a baseline for the discussion that 
follows, Chapter 7 provides a snapshot of democratic developments since second 
transitions in each (as of Spring 2007). Chapter 8 accounts for these developments – 
and, most importantly, their divergence – by tracing the influence of both leverage and 
legacies across the three cases. Chapter 9 summarizes and concludes.  
2. Some Definitions 
 I begin by elaborating some key concepts and definitions. The following helps 
to clarify what a democracy is and therefore what a transition to democracy entails. 
Once these conceptualizations are in place, it becomes easier to differentiate between 
more and less substantial improvements in the quality of democratic governance. 
Accounting for the differences observed is the objective of this analysis. 
2.1. What Is Democracy? 
A growing body of scholarship on what constitutes a democracy points to a 
number of elements beyond the minimum requirement of free and fair elections. 
Fareed Zakaria differentiates between liberal and “illiberal”5 democracy, a distinction 
that is also reflected in Larry Diamond’s concept of “electoral”6 democracy. Zakaria 
emphasizes that “democracy requires not only free, fair, and competitive elections, but 
also the freedoms that make them truly meaningful (such as freedom of organization 
                                                 
5
 Zakaria 1997: 22 
6
 Diamond 2002: 25 
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and freedom of expression), alternative sources of information, and institutions to 
ensure that government policies depend on the votes and preferences of citizens.”7 
Specifically, liberal democracy requires “the rule of law, a separation of powers, and 
the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.”8 Thus, 
there is an important difference between systems that feature only the formal 
structures of democracy – that is, elections – and those which also adhere to the 
principles of constitutional liberalism.9 This paper adopts the “thick” definition of 
democracy, which requires respect for civil liberties in addition to political rights, 
instead of a “thin” definition that equates democracy with elections.10  
2.2. Consolidating Democracy 
 Transitions from authoritarianism to democracy involve two distinct phases: the 
first is the installation of a democratic regime, while the second entails the 
consolidation of democratic institutions and practices. This latter phase leads to the 
enduring and effective functioning of democracy as a system.11 “In essence, 
consolidation is the process of achieving broad and deep legitimation, such that all 
significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the 
democratic regime is better for their society than any other realistic alterative.”12 For 
most theorists, this process of democratic consolidation takes place over a period of 
several years and requires deep-seated change at all levels of society. According to 
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s definition, consolidated democracy is “a political regime 
in which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned 
incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, ‘the only game in town.’”13 It is 
worth citing their expanded definition here in full, which in emphasizing the behavioral, 
attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions of consolidation illustrates the substantive 
requirements of liberal democracy as described above.  
Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no 
significant national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend 
significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a 
nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state. Attitudinally, a 
democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, 
even in the midst of major economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with 
                                                 
7
 Diamond 2002: 21 
8
 Zakaria 1997: 22 
9
 Zakaria 1997: 23 
10
 Wolchik 2003: 277-278 
11
 O’Donnell 1996: 37 
12
 Diamond 1996: 33 
13
 Linz/Stepan 1996: 15 
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incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are 
the most appropriate way to govern collective life, and when support for 
antisystem alternatives is quite small or more-or-less isolated from 
prodemocratic forces. Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated 
when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike become subject to, 
and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the bounds of the specific 
laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic 
process.14 
The progress made toward realizing such an outcome is the subject of analysis in this 
study.  
2.3. The Dependent Variable: Democratic Gains in Second Transitions 
The analysis that follows in this paper is concerned exclusively with political 
developments in the consolidation phase, that is, once the authoritarian regime has 
been displaced and a democratic government installed. It is therefore interested in 
measuring the gains achieved by democratic reformers once they take office.  
The theoretical work on consolidation highlighted above provides a useful 
frame for what the ultimate “end product” of democratization should look like. 
However, most cases of second transition have not yet reached that end point and 
instead lie somewhere along the path between postcommunist authoritarianism and 
liberal democracy. Because second transitions are a relatively recent phenomenon, 
the timeframe that can be considered here is necessarily very short. Most of the 
literature remains agnostic about how long the process of consolidation takes, though 
it does make clear that the time horizon is years, if not decades. Still, most studies 
treat it as a discrete variable where the only possible values are ‘present’ or ‘absent.’ It 
is exceedingly difficult to observe the degree to which a regime is consolidated. For 
that reason, the dependent variable for this study is defined as the degree of 
democratic gains and not as the degree of democratic consolidation.   
Moreover, the term “democratic consolidation” raises a number of analytical 
problems, as there is little theoretical work explaining how, when, or why democracy 
comes to settle as “the only game in town.” Setting up a causal argument involving 
democratic consolidation is very difficult because most definitions of the concept are 
so descriptive that the elements that constitute it cannot be separated from those 
hypothesized to have caused it. To avoid this kind of circular argumentation, I instead 
choose to focus on the concrete, measurable gains achieved under the new 
government. The democratic consolidation framework remains important to the 
                                                 
14
 Linz/Stepan 1996: 16 
 12
analysis, for instance guiding the understanding that democratization requires a 
transformation of behaviors and attitudes in addition to changes to the constitution. 
But specifying democratic gains as the subject of analysis eliminates definitional 
problems that are beyond the scope of this work. 
Democratic gains are measured easily using data on “Political Rights” and “Civil 
Liberties” that are collected annually by Freedom House and reported in its Freedom 
in the World surveys. Each country receives a score on either measure ranging from 1 
(free) to 7 (not free). The Political Rights scores reflect considerations of (1) electoral 
process, (2) political pluralism and participation, and (3) functioning of government 
(more specifically, the accountability and transparency of governance).15 The Civil 
Liberties category, on the other hand, considers (1) freedom of expression and belief, 
(2) associational and organizational rights, (3) rule of law, and (4) personal autonomy 
and individual rights.16 The Political Rights dataset thus corresponds to the basic 
minimum requirement of free and fair elections described above; the Civil Liberties 
data reflect the freedoms associated with constitutional liberalism. Following Zakaria’s 
formulation, liberal democracy requires strong marks on both measures.17  
This study evaluates the extent of democratic gains achieved by observing the 
size of improvement in score (in points) from one year to the next. The cumulative 
improvement from the start of the second transition through the end of 2006, for which 
the last data are available, of course depends on each transition’s starting point, which 
did vary from case to case. Some of the outgoing authoritarian regimes tolerated more 
freedoms than others. Although the Freedom House ratings measure freedom, rather 
than democracy per se, these scores are widely accepted in political science as an 
approximation of regime character. They offer a strong indicator of a country’s 
progress in reforming the relevant areas of political society. Likewise, observing these 
data over time provides a reasonable indicator of a country’s reform trajectory.  
3. Theoretical Foundations and Assumptions 
 With the subject of analysis now clearly defined, this section expands on some 
of the theoretical references made above and situates them within a broader analytical 
framework. Drawing on the standard literature on democratization as well as fresh 
insights into postcommunist political developments, this section begins to craft an 
                                                 
15
 Freedom House 2007d 
16
 Freedom House 2007d 
17
 Zakaria 1997: 23 
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argument explaining the differences observed in the reform trajectories of second 
transitions.  
3.1. Democratization and Postcommunist Transitions 
A first step in establishing a framework for analyzing second transitions is to 
examine the theoretical basis provided by analyses of past democratizations, 
particularly the initial transitions from communism. What has come to represent the 
standard canon of the democratization literature arose in response to the string of 
regime transformations known as the “third wave," which began in 1974 in Portugal 
and swept over much of Southern Europe and Latin America.18 When communism 
collapsed in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the third wave framework was 
applied to study the transitions taking place in that region. This literature is 
characterized by an actor-centric approach that attaches great significance to the 
choices made by the actors involved in a transition situation. As such, it represents a 
break with structural explanations, or those relying on factors such as economic 
development or culture to predict a country’s propensity for democracy, and instead 
attributes a regime’s resulting characteristics to the strategic interaction of elites in a 
transition situation.19  
Much of the theoretical work on developments subsequent to the initial 
transition moment, including that on democratic consolidation referenced above, also 
takes an actor-centered approach. Democracy requires not only “rules of the game,” 
but also cooperation with and support for those rules. Especially if it is to become 
embedded, or consolidated, transition to democracy must involve a shift in attitudes 
and behavior. The only possible source of this shift is the actors themselves. Larry 
Diamond notes, for example, that the consolidation phase involves “a transition from 
‘instrumental’ to ‘principled’ commitments to the democratic framework, a growth in 
trust and cooperation among political competitors, and a socialization of the general 
population.”20 Most third wave theorists are concerned with the attitudes and 
behaviors of elites only, but Diamond’s perspective suggests that a broader shift in 
political culture must additionally take place. In this vein, John Dryzek and Leslie 
Holmes argue for the necessity of a broader normative commitment, for an 
“acceptance on the part of ordinary people of the rules of the electoral game, and of 
                                                 
18
 Huntington 1991 
19
 See Przeworski 1991a: 51-95 
20
 Diamond 1999: 65 
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the legitimacy of the political system to which elections are central.”21 It is reasonable 
to believe that widespread support for and satisfaction with the experience of 
democracy will have a reinforcing effect.22  
Nevertheless, establishing a democracy first requires a substantive shift at the 
elite level. For theorists of the third wave, new democracies can be crafted by political 
elites, and relatively quickly.23 Elites have the most direct and observable impact on 
the creation of the new democracy’s specific institutional forms, but it is also their 
behaviors and attitudes that establish its legitimacy, both in elite circles and among the 
broader public. Following the institutional learning model, democratic values need to 
be practiced before they are internalized.24 Particularly in new democracies, attitudes 
toward democracy form largely in response to that system’s initial performance. As 
Larry Diamond has found, “citizens weigh independently—and much more heavily—
the political performance of the system, in particular, the degree to which it delivers on 
its promise of freedom and democracy.”25 As will be elaborated below, it is precisely 
for this reason that the abuses of postcommunist authoritarianism are hypothesized to 
be harmful to future democratic prospects. 
The actor-centered orientation of the third wave, particularly its emphasis on 
elites, lays the first part of the foundation for the analysis developed in this paper. Part 
of the third wave framework that has been called into question in the postcommunist 
context and that is not adopted in this paper is the model’s prediction that a 
democratic outcome is most likely in transition situations where the distribution of 
power is equal or unknown. Under such conditions, according to third wave theorists, 
elites bargain to lock in at least partial gains, a system of checks and balances, and 
the opportunity for future challenge to the status quo – that is, democracy – even 
though it is only a second best outcome for both sides.26 This result is quite 
unintentional: “Democracy emerges not because it is the object of the politicians’ 
collective ambition, but because it is a practical compromise.”27 Thus, despite the 
central role attributed to the actors in this bargaining process, it is still not an entirely 
agency-centered argument. For theorists of the third wave, the dynamics of the 
                                                 
21
 Dryzek/Holmes 2002: 8-9 
22
 Ishiyama 2001: 27 
23
 Bunce 2004: 219 
24
 Rohrschneider 2003: 50 
25
 Diamond 1999: 192 
26
 Przeworski 1991a: 51-99  
27
 McFaul 2006b: 9 
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transition situation remain the critical factor in producing democracy. As Michael 
McFaul underscores, “ideas, norms, and beliefs played little or no role in these 
transition theories.”28 
3.2. Democracy and Democrats 
As transitions from communism have worn on into their second decade, they 
have demonstrated trends that challenge the third wave’s hypotheses and diverge 
empirically from patterns evidenced in Southern Europe or Latin America.29 Thus, 
McFaul has put forth an argument that favors considering the postcommunist 
transformations in a separate analytical category, or a “fourth wave.” He observes 
empirically that democratic outcomes have resulted less from stalemated negotiations 
than from confrontations involving the mobilization of mass actors. According to 
McFaul’s argument, the dominant factor determining the outcomes of transitions from 
communism was the local balance of power, with the stronger side dictating the rules 
of the game: “If the powerful believed in democratic principles, then they imposed 
democratic institutions. But if they believed in autocratic principles, then they imposed 
autocratic institutions.”30 An even distribution of power led not to pacting as the third 
wave had predicted, but to unstable outcomes that were neither democratic nor 
entirely authoritarian.  
This revision to the actor-centrism of the third wave holds that people – not 
structural factors or specific transition dynamics – are responsible for establishing a 
democratic regime.31 This observation is significant for theorizing about second 
transitions, particularly given the democratic principles and values proclaimed by the 
leaders those transitions swept into power. McFaul’s insights provide two of this 
paper’s base assumptions. The first is that the primary reason the countries under 
analysis failed in their initial attempt to democratize is because the leaders who came 
to power (or remained in power, as occurred in some instances) did not espouse 
democratic principles. Second, I proceed from the assumption that, in second 
transitions, the democratic orientation of elites is a basic prerequisite for a democratic 
outcome. The primacy of actors and their influence on outcomes underlies the 
expectation that second transitions – by definition, led by democrats – should produce 
                                                 
28
 McFaul 2002: 213 
29
 McFaul 2002: 212 
30
 McFaul 2002: 223 
31
 McFaul 2006: 42 
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democracy as a result. The puzzle explored in this paper is why they sometimes do 
not.  
McFaul’s framework simplifies transition situations by regarding the challengers 
to the incumbent regime as democrats and the ruling elites as autocrats. In accepting 
this framework as a starting point, it is recognized that the idea that regime 
challengers are committed democrats may be an overly generalized assumption. 
Nonetheless, it seems a reasonable one in this context, given that second transitions 
invariably brought groups of elites to power who defined themselves in opposition to 
the authoritarian style of their predecessors. This is substantiated by the observation 
that the winners in each of these elections mobilized support around such themes as 
deposing the semi-authoritarian regime or returning to normalcy. Furthermore, from a 
methodological standpoint, it would be impossible to objectively examine the extent or 
authenticity of elites’ commitment to democratic principles and ideals at the time of 
transition. Thus, the argument presented in the following begins with the acceptance 
that those who came to power in second transitions represented a certain orientation 
toward democracy, change, and reform.   
The understanding here is that the primary responsibility for institutionalizing 
democratic structures and behaviors lies with people, most prominently the elites 
involved in orchestrating and implementing the transition. Yet agency arguments do 
not capture the full picture. Crafting democracy is not simply a matter of human 
agency, for in no situation does political will alone guarantee the desired outcome. As 
in any political context, structural and environmental factors shape and constrain the 
choices available to actors and the incentives associated with them. Perhaps more 
importantly, such factors influence not only the actors’ will, but also their capacity to 
implement the agenda of their choosing.32 Moreover, it has been forcefully argued that 
even the most incorruptible leaders require strong institutions and vigorous opposition 
to keep them honest.33 
4. Independent Variables and Hypotheses 
As outlined above, the point of departure for this paper is the understanding 
that second transitions bring democratic elites to power and that democratic elites are 
a minimum prerequisite for democracy. The extent to which second transitions 
                                                 
32
 Bunce 2004: 225 
33
 Fish 2001: 54 
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produce democratic gains, however, may be encouraged or constrained by factors 
present in the international or domestic environments.  
4.1. The International Environment: Leverage of the European Union 
As many authors have argued, geographic proximity has served an important 
function in the diffusion of democracy.34 In the postcommunist context, empirical 
studies have emphasized the important role of a supportive external environment in 
democratizing the region. However, a consensus appears to have been reached that 
the influence of the international community, represented here as the European Union, 
first becomes important in the consolidation phase.35 The EU offered increased aid 
and trade concessions to the region after 1989. In 1993, it began what would become 
its most ambitious expansion by setting the conditions for membership (the 
‘Copenhagen Criteria’). Accession negotiations with five Central and Eastern 
European applicants began in 1998.36  
4.1.1. A Credible EU Membership Perspective 
There are many different ways in which the EU might be hypothesized to 
support democratization, from the indirect influence of leading by example to the 
concrete mechanisms of its policy instruments and financial assistance programs.37 
Detailed studies show that the EU’s real contribution to regional democratization 
processes lies in structuring domestic interests and providing incentives for publics 
and leaders to stay the course of reform.38 To this end, it has a uniquely powerful tool 
at its disposal in the form of the lure of membership. Trade preferences and other 
forms of political support are helpful on some level, but as Karen Smith observes, 
“where there is little or no possibility that countries will be allowed to join the most 
exclusive organizations, the West may not be so influential because it cannot and will 
not hold out the most significant carrots.”39 Therefore, in defining the EU’s influence as 
an independent variable for this study, I first narrow its large potential influence to this 
most significant aspect. In a second step, following what Milada Anna Vachudova 
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terms the ‘meritocracy principle,’40 I tighten this definition to the presence or absence 
of a credible prospect of membership in the European Union.  
According to Vachudova, the EU’s pattern of extending privileges roughly on 
the basis of merit, with applicants’ places in the membership queue corresponding to 
their progress on implementing the acquis communautaire, lends credibility to the 
promise of eventual membership.41 As Tim Haughton observed with respect to the 
European Council’s 1997 decision to invite five of the ten Central European states to 
begin accession negotiations, but to postpone further discussions with the other five: 
“This willingness to open the negotiation doors to those deemed to have met the 
criteria seemed to demonstrate that the EU’s offer of membership was genuine, 
providing a clear signal for those left out that by enacting the required changes the 
much sought-after reward could be achieved.”42 Applying Vachudova’s argument to 
second transitions, the meritocracy principle communicates the understanding that 
“however dismal a country’s past record of respecting democratic standards and 
human rights, it c[an] ‘rehabilitate’ itself by implementing the necessary reforms.”43  
A credible membership perspective – which therefore does not have to mean 
immediate candidate status, but rather implies that the door is open should the country 
choose to complete the required steps – promotes substantial democratic gains in 
second transitions by providing an anchor for the new democratic trajectory. This 
distinction is important: A country undergoing a second transition most likely does not 
meet many of the conditions that would confer immediate candidate status, but it is 
quite plausible to assume that the incentive of integration begins with this earlier 
recognition that the door is open if progress in certain areas is made. The presence or 
absence of a credible perspective for membership might therefore be proxied by 
statements made by the EU in strategy documents, Council conclusions, and policy 
communications regarding a country’s status. Where the prospect of membership is 
absent or uncertain, the EU cannot be expected to play as strong a role in supporting 
the country’s transition. 
4.1.2. Conditionality and Reluctant Cases  
Within this context, the specific mechanism by which the EU exercises its 
leverage is conditionality, which rewards countries with financial assistance, political 
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support, and eventually membership if they adapt to standards required by the EU in 
the political, economic, and social realms. In theory, though much less in practice, 
failure to meet these standards carries consequences as well. As Geoffrey Pridham 
summarizes, “conditionality trades more on persuasion and temptation than 
coercion.”44 But what about countries that are not so easily tempted? 
Analysts differ with respect to whether the ‘pull of the West’ operates merely as 
a complementary influence within an already favorable domestic environment or 
whether it has a stronger catalyzing effect. In any case, and as is acknowledged in the 
literature, the EU’s leverage seems to be at least partially determined by the 
receptiveness of its target.45 Determining the relationship between conditionality and 
receptiveness is problematic. Moreover, this relationship becomes more difficult to 
disentangle with time, as conditionality reinforces positive behavior but, as Karen 
Smith points out, can trap non-reformers in the “slow lane.”46 The literature usually 
ascribes instances of ineffective conditionality to a lack of political will or the presence 
of an alternative source of support. But, as Juliet Johnson asserts with respect to 
theorizing about failed reform processes in general, “arguing that [these] fail because 
policymakers do not implement them with enough enthusiasm sidesteps the more 
interesting question of what underlying institutional features may be enabling or 
impeding such change.”47 Similarly, the argument that EU conditionality is not always 
effective because some states are less susceptible to its influence misses the 
opportunity to uncover domestic pressures or other factors that might explain why 
some states are less receptive than others.  
To determine the degree of influence that can be attributed to the EU 
independent of the factors potentially working against it, the important question is 
whether a credible membership perspective ever existed, most significantly at the 
outset of the second transition. That is, was the door sufficiently open to allow the 
target government to recognize an opportunity of the sort described by Haughton 
above? Given the assumption made in this analysis that second transitions brought 
democratic reformers to power, there should not be any lack of political will on the part 
of transition countries to follow up this opportunity if it in fact exists. It is for this reason 
that only the EU’s stance toward future membership is operationalized here. It is 
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assumed that the democratic governments that come to power in second transitions 
are susceptible to EU pressure.  
To be able to compare the cases on this measure, I primarily consider each 
country’s membership perspective at the beginning of its second transition. Because 
conditionality rewards countries for progress made, the way a prospective member’s 
relationship with the EU develops over time strongly reflects its own choices and 
behaviors. Considering the EU’s initial openness to a membership perspective isolates 
the EU’s influence from actions taken by the transition country. The analysis is 
ultimately interested in the role the EU plays throughout the course of second 
transitions, but its leverage at the outset is used to enhance opportunities for 
comparison. Assessing signals and statements made by the EU at this point in time 
should give a reasonable indication of whether it was present as a force for 
consolidation. 
4.1.3. First to Second Transitions 
When considering the transitions from communism that began in 1989, the 
influence of the EU provides a powerful explanation for much – but not all – of the 
observed regime diversity. The majority of the liberal democratic success cases 
clustered along its borders, and most of illiberal regimes were located further to the 
east.48 A few cases defied this logic, most conspicuously Slovakia in the first years 
after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. As noted above, the common explanation 
given for irregular outcomes such as this one has been lack of political will or popular 
support from within the country.  
In second transitions, the EU’s leverage might be hypothesized to be even 
stronger, due both to the positive example set by the early democratizers and to the 
EU’s recognition that its accession process serves as a unique tool in promoting 
democracy. The enlargement policies of the early 1990s were established somewhat 
reluctantly, and the Copenhagen criteria were initially designed to keep undesirable 
members out.49 But by the end of the decade, the EU had begun to treat its 
membership process as an answer to the political, economic, and security challenges 
in its neighborhood.50 
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For second transitions, it also can be observed that the EU’s influence did not 
begin with the second transition breakthrough, but rather had already exercised a 
weak influence under the illiberal regime and may even have been a factor 
contributing to its demise. Vachudova argues that the EU can be seen to have a role 
in shaping the domestic political dialogue in all of the transition countries, providing 
incentive for elites – significantly, also those from illiberal parties – to adapt their 
positions to EU expectations and presenting a focal point for cooperation among 
otherwise fragmented opposition groups.51  
As will be elaborated below, the postcommunist authoritarian regimes were far 
less isolated than their communist predecessors. With the Soviet Union gone and no 
other patron available, their leaders may have eschewed democratization, but they 
were compelled to cooperate enough to qualify for financial assistance and other 
forms of political support from the West. Much for this reason, their regimes adopted 
democratic constructs, at least formally.52 Postcommunist authoritarian regimes were 
also more open in the sense that they allowed some degree of opposition and civil 
society to exist. This, combined with a greater degree of openness to the outside 
world, facilitated the growth of linkages between domestic and external actors.53 
These linkages strengthened domestic opposition and civil society and are believed to 
have been instrumental over time in establishing the conditions that enabled second 
transitions in the first place.54 This is not to say that the wish to join the EU was the 
force driving citizens to the ballot box, but rather that conditionality and linkages 
weakened postcommunist authoritarian regimes over time and played a role in altering 
the balance of power that led to their defeat.  
The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that any consideration 
of the EU’s democratizing effects in second transitions has to account for the modest 
influence it exerted even before second transitions began. In this study, I believe it is 
sufficiently captured by my assumptions regarding the significance of a credible 
membership perspective. I hypothesize that the net effect of the European Union’s 
leverage in the intervening years was to cultivate the understanding that specific 
reforms had to be undertaken before enhanced benefits could be realized. This 
hypothesis neatly accounts for both the subtle role of the EU in bringing about second 
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transition breakthroughs and the importance attributed to the openness of the EU’s 
stance toward membership at the outset of the second transition.  
A final point that must be taken into account is that past enlargements 
inevitably have altered the EU’s internal dynamics. Changes in its uptake capacity 
resulting from its previous commitments give new candidates reason to doubt the 
credibility of a chance at future membership. Since it nevertheless seems unlikely that 
the EU will renege on past promises, the EU’s positions toward each of the three 
countries at the outset of their second transitions are taken at face value. Enlargement 
fatigue certainly can be expected to play an increasing role in the future, but for now 
the presence of a membership perspective is assumed to exist everywhere that the 
EU has acknowledged one. Where an EU membership perspective is present, it 
should provide a compelling incentive to stay the course of reform. 
4.2. The Domestic Environment: Legacies of Postcommunist Authoritarianism 
In addition to the external pull factor of EU membership, countries undergoing 
second transitions are subject to a set of factors that pull in the opposite direction. The 
pattern of regime trajectories arising from the initial 1989 transitions suggests a strong 
role for the EU, but fails to persuade that the EU’s influence has been uniformly 
positive. Academic contributions have gone a long way in explaining the specific 
mechanisms through which the EU exercises its leverage, but they have been less 
convincing in accounting for the regime diversity observed within the EU’s sphere of 
influence. All of this calls into question how sufficiently the EU factor is able to account 
for the divergent outcomes of second transitions and to what extent lesser-explored 
factors may contribute. Accordingly, this paper introduces a second hypothesis: that a 
strong factor in the domestic environment of states undergoing a second transition – 
namely, the legacies of postcommunist authoritarianism – plays a significant 
constraining role.  
4.2.1. Path Dependency and Legacies 
Sociological- and historical-institutional analysis has found a great deal of 
sympathy in postcommunist studies, where scholars have noted remarkable continuity 
with the past in many areas. Despite radical changes that eliminated communism and 
socialist planning, the construction of a new political system did not begin entirely from 
scratch. Remnants of communism in the form of sociopolitical cleavages, inherited 
informal rules and networks, persistence of old elites and hierarchies, traditions of 
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patronage and protection, and “prevailing attitudes inimical to liberal values such as 
intolerance and mistrust of authority”55 are understood to obstruct the development of 
democracy.56 On the economic front, the legacies of, among other things, inefficient 
organization, oversized firms, a soft budget constraint, distorted welfare expectations, 
and egalitarian ideology pose similar challenges to market reforms.57  
In this paper, the role of legacies is understood as the “persistence of formal 
institutions, social organizations, or industrial structures constructed under the old 
regime that inhibit the formation of new states, democratic accountability, market-
oriented behavior, and horizontal social linkages.”58 Or, in the policy realm, as 
structures or choices that, following path dependency theory, constrain future choices 
available to economic and political actors. Path dependency theorists rely on 
“institutional legacies, initial conditions, and cultural patterns to explain the difficulties 
behind institutional design.” In addition, “choices made at critical junctures lock in 
future choices and development.”59 In accounting for the diversity of outcomes in the 
initial postcommunist transitions, the legacy perspective suggests that the frontrunners 
enjoyed the level of success they did not (only) because they exerted considerable 
political will, but because they started from a point that was “closer to the finish line,”60 
having for the most part been set back by a comparatively brief four decades of 
communism and benefiting from some collective memory of democracy and 
independence. 
In applying the idea of legacies to second transitions, I expect to uncover some 
familiar patterns, but also some new ones. Several of the legacies of communism are 
likely to still be in play in second transitions, particularly in cases where little reform 
was undertaken in the in-between years of postcommunist authoritarianism. In 
addition, I argue that postcommunist authoritarian rule carries unique legacies of its 
own. In another application of path dependency theory, the legacies specifically 
attributable to postcommunist authoritarianism represent a particular challenge to 
democratic political development because they developed at a critical juncture when 
the countries had shed communism and were newly embarking on a transition to 
“democracy.” This argument will be developed further in the sections that follow. To 
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better understand what these specific legacies are, and before hypothesizing about 
how they matter, the next section examines the distinctive features of postcommunist 
authoritarian rule. 
4.2.2. Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist Context 
Before analyzing political developments in second transitions, it is useful to 
consider their starting point. The phrase “postcommunist authoritarianism” has been 
used in this paper up until now as a generic term to describe the non-democratic form 
of governance that took hold after the collapse of communism in much of the Eurasian 
region. However, this kind of authoritarianism does have quite distinctive 
characteristics, particularly in contrast to communist rule. This section examines the 
particular features of this regime type. 
The pattern of democratization followed by return to autocratic governance is 
by no means unique to the Eurasian region or to a postcommunist setting. Such 
regime trajectories have become the subject of increasing theoretical attention as 
scholars have observed systemic deficiencies in many of the third wave democracies. 
Democracies may be more numerous today than at any other time in history, but 
many of them fall short on substance.61 Accordingly, there has been little theoretical 
work focusing on authoritarianism exclusively in the postcommunist context, and no 
separate prototype of the postcommunist cases has been constructed. Instead, cases 
of postcommunist authoritarianism are commonly treated within the frameworks of 
“semi-authoritarianism”62 or “competitive authoritarianism”63 that are applied 
universally to conceptualize regimes that lie somewhere between democracy and 
autocracy. For the most part, these frameworks are also accepted and applied in this 
paper. 
One aspect that deserves additional emphasis, however, is that postcommunist 
authoritarian regimes often presided over the beginning of the so-called “dual 
transformation” that transitions from communism required. That is, postcommunist 
transitions were unique in that the process of establishing democracy was 
accompanied by the need to dismantle the planned economy and introduce market 
reforms. The concurrent processes were also deeply intertwined, as the transfer of 
public assets necessarily involves “the creation of an entirely new class of 
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entrepreneurs and owners in a way that has to be decided and justified in a political 
way and through political actors.”64 The large-scale privatizations involved in this 
process offered exaggerated opportunities for corruption and cronyism. Though 
patronage systems are a common feature of semi-authoritarian regimes, the sweeping 
system-level changes that occurred on the watch of postcommunist authoritarian 
leaders are lacking in parallel. This unique feature will be considered along with the 
documented characteristics of semi- and competitive authoritarianism (terms hereafter 
used interchangeably). 
4.2.3. Characteristics of Postcommunist Authoritarian Rule 
Following Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s work on competitive 
authoritarianism, the distinctive features of such regimes share a basis in the fact that 
they are autocracies by democratic rules. That is to say, formal democratic institutions 
not only exist, but also are viewed as the only legitimate means to gain and retain 
power.65 However, these formal rules are frequently and routinely violated to an extent 
that disqualifies the regime from being considered a democracy. Still, the leaders’ 
tactics of manipulation and harassment fall short of full-scale authoritarianism.66 
Because of the important contrast to communism, it is worth underscoring that such 
regimes do accommodate limited freedoms and allow some degree of opposition and 
civil society to exist. 
Under competitive authoritarianism, elections are held regularly and often are 
not massively fraudulent. As Marina Ottoway points out, this is because they do not 
have to be: “Power distribution is unbalanced, with a dominant government party and 
a weak opposition; institutions in many cases exist in name only; and the culture of 
democracy is not well developed.”67 The dominant government party sets restrictions 
on competing political organizations, exploits public finances, controls the flow of 
information to citizens, suppresses independent media, manipulates election 
schedules, and employs other such tactics to intimidate and harass – sometimes 
violently – opposition candidates and their supporters.68 Rather than ban opposition 
outright, semi-authoritarian incumbents use more understated methods, such as 
“bribery, co-optation, and more subtle forms of persecution, such as the use of tax 
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authorities, compliant judiciaries, and other state agencies to ‘legally’ harass, 
persecute, or extort cooperative behavior from critics.”69  
But semi-authoritarian regimes cannot rely entirely on their ability to manipulate 
the playing field; they require at least some genuine support. Semi-authoritarian 
regimes thus are often highly personality-driven, though they are sometimes backed 
by a party organization.70 Power is centralized in the executive, legislatures tend to be 
weak, and bribery and other attempts to subordinate the judiciary are common.71 
Constitutions and laws are superficially respected, but can in most cases be altered at 
will.72 In addition to these methods, ranging from the questionable to the outright 
fraudulent, semi-authoritarians build extensive patronage networks to retain their hold 
on power.73 As noted above, privatizations are a key tool in their efforts to secure and 
reward loyalists. At the same time, corruption strengthens the regime’s hold on power 
by building up the party’s finances and making it even more difficult for the opposition 
to compete.74 Finally, the semi-authoritarians “play on the population’s fear of 
instability and change,”75 which in the postcommunist context often has taken the form 
of nationalism.  
4.2.4. Implications of Postcommunist Authoritarian Rule 
Some semblance of democracy is important in semi-authoritarian regimes, as 
the label “democracy” provides some cover and legitimacy, both domestically and 
internationally.76 This is necessary because the emergence of a liberal hegemony at 
the end of the Cold War removed sources of support for alternative regime models 
and created incentives to democratize, especially if the government wanted to receive 
financial assistance or maintain a standing in the international community.77 It is also 
because of this adherence to formal democratic rules that there is some degree of 
openness and that breakthroughs are occasionally possible. But it is also for this 
reason that this system’s legacies are particularly harmful. 
From the description offered above, it is clear that postcommunist 
authoritarianism does not fulfill a newly democratizing country’s hopes for freedom 
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and prosperity. But do these regimes simply delay the onset of democratization, or 
does the fact that they represented each country’s first experience with “democracy” 
and masqueraded more or less successfully as such fundamentally alter the character 
of transition? This paper argues that it does.  
To sketch out the hypothesis in brief, I refer back to the understanding that 
establishing a democracy requires changes in attitudes and behaviors in addition to 
new structures and institutions. Considering these dimensions, I argue that the 
legacies of a postcommunist authoritarian experience impinge on the future 
development of a democratic polity in at least two ways. First, concerning structures 
and behaviors, the challenge of reforming the flawed, incomplete, or misused 
democratic institutions is qualitatively different and perhaps greater than building new 
ones (as was the task of reform governments that took over directly from the 
communists). After building the first institutions of democracy, postcommunist 
authoritarian regimes then poisoned them with non-democratic behaviors, distorting 
the polity’s view of what democracy looks like. Attempts to establish a functioning 
democratic system in a second transition are obstructed by legacies of entrenched 
interests, overconcentration of power in the executive, subordinated legislatures and 
judiciaries, weak opposition, and the culture of combativeness, distrust, and 
unwillingness to compromise it engendered. Second, the postcommunist authoritarian 
regime’s continued violations of human rights betrayed public trust, and its 
suppression of political freedoms undermined the development of a capable and 
informed civil society. Its failure to deliver on promises of democracy, particularly at 
the critical juncture that came at the end of communism, severely impedes the growth 
of a democratic political culture and does lasting damage to democratic legitimacy. 
While not a perfect indicator, legacies might plausibly be hypothesized to 
correlate with the number of years the regime held power as well as how oppressive it 
was, as measured by the same Freedom House “Political Rights” and “Civil Liberties” 
scores explained above. Where it did not hold power for very long, the postcommunist 
authoritarian regime probably did less damage. The specific characteristics of each 
regime are also explored in order to better understand their legacies. Generally, the 
stronger the authoritarian legacies, the weaker I expect the democratic gains realized 
in the second transition will be. Before turning to the specific cases, the next sections 
outline the anticipated undermining effects of postcommunist authoritarian legacies in 
greater detail. 
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4.2.5. The Dual Transition and Legacies of Privatization 
Joel Hellman’s seminal work on the politics of partial reform showed that there 
is a danger that the “early winners” of transition will attempt to preserve their 
concentrated gains, mostly economic, by blocking any reforms that eliminate the 
market distortions from which they benefit.78 Though partial reform carries significant 
social cost for the general public, these early winners are often powerful enough to 
leverage outcomes to their continued advantage. This danger is exacerbated in non-
inclusive political systems.79 
Though not the only means by which the early winners gained advantage, 
flawed postcommunist privatizations allowed them to become deeply entrenched and 
influential, corrupting not only the prospects of economic reform, but also the political 
system itself. Indeed, the “window for democratic consolidation may not remain open 
forever,”80 as after a certain point elites lose incentive to deepen democracy and 
instead act to protect their gains, both in power and property. The challenge to politics 
is to advance reforms in the face of efforts by the early winners to maintain what 
Hellman calls a partial reform equilibrium.81 Where power is concentrated with the 
winners – such as in postcommunist authoritarian systems where privatization and 
cronyism went hand-in-hand – partial reforms are more likely to persist. 
Even with the elimination of the authoritarian regime and the broadening of the 
political process, this dynamic is difficult to reverse. The rents already obtained are not 
easily redistributed, nor is a deep purge of society politically or practically feasible. The 
early winners remain a constituency opposing deeper reform. Having already obtained 
a concentration of wealth, they retain disproportionate influence even in a democratic 
system, since candidates and parties have to finance their campaigns. An additional 
legacy concerns the perceived illegitimacy with which these privatizations were carried 
out, which facilitates a lasting association of market reform with lawlessness and 
chaos. Where such perceptions prevail, they can be hypothesized to reduce the 
legitimacy of and popular support for the new system as a whole.  
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4.2.6. Abused Beyond Repair? Flawed and Misused Institutions 
In the purely political realm, one of the first and most important tasks facing 
postcommunist governments was the design of democratic institutions. Where illiberal 
regimes developed out of founding elections, formative decisions such as the drafting 
of a constitution, the choice of a presidential or parliamentary system, or the design of 
an electoral and party system fell to authoritarian-inclined leaders. The imperative of 
concentrating power translated into strong executives and personality politics. While 
doing their utmost to prevent any real checks and balances, semi-authoritarian 
regimes were clever enough to establish at least a shell of horizontal accountability. 
Courts and parliaments were set up, though they could hardly be considered 
independent bodies given the level of manipulation and harassment to which they 
were routinely subjected. More significant than formal designs, however, is they way 
these institutions were subverted by the behavior of the elites operating within them.  
It is the complex task of second transitions to break down these patterns and 
establish new ones. That courts and legislatures can be rid of corruption and these 
institutions with no experience of actually performing checks and balances can be 
transformed into constructive players in a genuine democracy is a longer term 
proposition. Even with the removal of the illiberal leadership, it is impossible to purge 
the full bureaucracy. Additionally, it is not only past regime adherents whose behaviors 
and attitudes potentially detract. While in opposition, members of the new government 
had been equally exposed to, if not full participants in, the toxic political discourse. The 
combativeness and distrust that characterized political life lingers in behaviors and 
mindsets. For historically weak and fragmented oppositions, there is no guarantee that 
taking over the task of governing will suddenly induce trust and cooperation. Thus, 
already at the elite level, there are a number of patterns to break and challenges to 
confront.  
4.2.7. Euphoria Turned Disenchantment: The Damage to Political Culture 
The final set of postcommunist authoritarian legacies  damage perceptions and 
expectations of democracy and have negative effects on the formation of democratic 
political culture. Like all new democracies, countries beginning second transitions lack 
many of the features Adam Przeworski claims are necessary to support democracy: 
“representative organizations are weak, civil society is highly fragmented, memories of 
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political abuse are still fresh, antidemocratic ideologies are quite alive.”82 But second 
transitions bear a distinctive additional burden. After the “autumn of the people”83 in 
1989, the public saw its hopes dashed. The euphoria experienced at the onset of 
transition gave way to widespread disenchantment at what it delivered. Second 
transitions thus are susceptible to what Ottoway terms “transition fatigue.” The initial 
transition was cause for much optimism, but, as she explains, “it is difficult for people 
to be sanguine about renewed change when the transition they experienced has 
plunged the country into turmoil, war, or economic decline.”84 Exhausted by instability 
and hardship, citizens may be skeptical of the promise of a new “democracy.” This 
sense of disillusionment is not likely to fade if corrupt practices and elite infighting 
continue under the new government.  
Still, citizens’ feelings of disengagement or frustration at the course of political 
developments may be the lesser concern. Postcommunist authoritarian leaders 
enjoyed for a time a genuine degree of support, suggesting that political culture was 
not merely being suppressed, but rather that it was developing in a non-democratic 
direction. In the more severe cases, the regime exploited cleavages to win support or 
to create a crisis situation in which its acts of repression could be attributed to the 
extraordinary circumstances. Where the populace itself took an illiberal turn, the 
legacies of intolerance and conflict in political discourse as well as in ideology prove a 
far greater challenge to overcome. 
4.3. Interaction among the Variables 
The following analysis examines how the two factors proposed here – leverage 
and legacies – have affected the outcomes of second transitions in Slovakia, Croatia, 
and Serbia. With variation on both independent variables, I treat each variable 
separately, although I suspect there is considerable complementariness – if not a 
certain interplay – between them. It is easy to see how a favorable international 
environment (strong incentive from the EU) in combination with favorable domestic 
conditions (weak legacies) would reinforce one another to facilitate democratic gains. 
Likewise, where neither dimension favors consolidation – i.e. where legacies are 
strong and the role of the EU is weak – the task appears much more difficult. In 
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between those poles, however, it is less clear what the dynamics of the relationship 
might be. Does one influence prevail over the other?  
A preliminary hypothesis might be that there is actually a degree of interaction 
between the two variables, with legacies exerting a stronger constraining influence in 
the short term and leverage coming to bear over the longer term. Where the EU has a 
presence, legacies determine the initial democratic gains. If these are strong, the 
country’s gains will be less substantial. Where the regime’s legacies are more 
moderate, the new government will achieve more dramatic gains. The EU factor will 
reinforce the country’s progress even further as conditionality begins rewarding gains. 
In the longer term, legacies weaken as the polity gains credible experience with 
democracy.  
Of course, neither geography nor history is destiny. Favorable international and 
domestic conditions are not sufficient to determine outcomes, either independently or 
in combination with one another. Recalling the assumption that second transitions 
install a democratic regime, the only necessary (but, as suggested above, not 
independently sufficient) prerequisite for democratic gains is a reform orientation by 
the government. Legacies can be expected to slow their efforts, but a conducive 
international environment may then serve as part of a formula for overcoming the 
harmful legacies of the past. Since the time period that can be covered in this paper is 
less than ten years, I expect that variation in the legacies of postcommunist 
authoritarianism will correlate more closely with the observed regime outcomes. 
5. Three Cases of Postcommunist Authoritarianism 
It is clear from the overview of postcommunist authoritarianism already given 
that such leaders undermine the spirit and the letter of democracy. While unmistakably 
of a common mold, postcommunist authoritarian regimes nevertheless vary 
considerably in the extent and means by which they establish and maintain control. 
With the prototype outlined above as a guide, this section examines the qualitative 
differences in the nature of postcommunist authoritarianism as it was experienced in 
Slovakia (1993-1998), Croatia (1991-2000), and Serbia (1990-2000). More than just 
the number of years or electoral cycles that the regime held power, the degree to 
which it repressed freedoms and the methods it used to dominate the political 
environment should prove telling indicators of the regime’s impact on the polity.  
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Table 1 shows how the postcommunist authoritarian regimes in Slovakia, 
Croatia, and Serbia compared to one another on Freedom House’s Political Rights 
and Civil Liberties measures. Following the “thick” definition of democracy given 
previously, and given the tendency of semi-authoritarian regimes to perform 
sufficiently on the political rights measure while severely undercutting civil liberties, 
both scores are essential considerations in evaluating regime character. The table not 
only allows a rough relative assessment of the regimes in relation to one another; it 
also shows that the differences between them were quite significant, with scores 
ranging from the near-top to the near-bottom of the Freedom House scale.  
Table 1. Political Rights and Civil Liberties under Postcommunist Authoritarianism 
Country / Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Independent 
Slovakia 
PR 
CL 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
… 
3 
4 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
4 
2 
4 
2 
2 
… 
… 
… 
… 
Independent 
Croatia 
PR 
CL 
… 
… 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
… 
… 
Serbia  
(FYR) 
PR 
CL 
5 
4 
6 
5 
6 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
5 
5 
4 
4 
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World, Historical Rankings 1973-2006 
In the following sections, each regime is profiled in detail to give meaning to the 
variation in the scores. For purposes of comparability, the profiles are structured as 
uniformly as possible and cover to the extent possible the criteria that Freedom House 
uses to evaluate regimes in its surveys. As noted previously, these are, for Political 
Rights: (1) electoral process, (2) political pluralism and participation, and (3) 
accountability and transparency of governance. For Civil Liberties: (1) freedom of 
expression and belief, (2) associational and organizational rights, (3) rule of law, and 
(4) personal autonomy and individual rights. The profiles also reference the 
privatization proceedings conducted under each regime, since this paper considers 
them a uniquely important aspect of postcommunist authoritarian rule. 
5.1. Slovakia, 1993-1998 
In Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar negotiated the 1993 breakup of Czechoslovakia 
and then served as the first prime minister of independent Slovakia. As prime minister, 
he presided over a democratic deficit that prompted then-US Secretary of State 
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Madeleine Albright to call the country “a black hole in the heart of Europe.” Mečiar’s 
Slovakia consistently scored a 2 on Political Rights, and on this measure was similar 
to its Central European counterparts. It hovered between 3 and 4 on Civil Liberties, 
earning it the designation “partly free.”85 Although elected freely and fairly, Mečiar 
demonstrated authoritarian tendencies that ranged from discrimination against 
minorities to bald intimidation of journalists and political opponents.86  
Having guided Slovakia to independence, Mečiar found it easy to exploit 
feelings of nationalism to maintain support. The national question had been on the 
agenda throughout Slovakia’s history, with its national identity developing in relation 
first to the Hungarians of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and later to the Czechs.87 
Mečiar adopted what Bútora and Bútorová have called a “confrontational nationalist 
policy,”88 openly discriminating against the large (11%) and politically active ethnic 
Hungarian population.89 His government was “so inhospitable to ethnic minorities and 
so intolerant of political opposition that both the European Union and NATO rejected 
its application for membership on political grounds alone.”90 Likewise, Freedom House 
attributed the drop in Slovakia’s Civil Liberties score to 4 in 1996 and 1997 to 
government pressure on freedom of expression and minority rights.91  
On the political rights criteria noted above, electoral process was largely 
respected; Mečiar was elected freely and fairly on two separate occasions. He was 
even democratically removed from office by no-confidence vote for a short time in 
1993, and his comeback in 1994 was conducted legally. His regime did occasionally 
manipulate electoral law, for example to change district make-up or the percentage of 
votes required by opposition parties to obtain seats in Parliament.92 But the absence 
of more glaring violations allowed elections to be consistently evaluated as free and 
fair. Concerning representation, there was an emergent multi-party system, though it 
was dominated by a single polarizing figure. Moreover, the government’s hostility 
toward initiatives by ethnic Hungarians to strengthen minority rights as well as the idea 
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of a constitutional amendment introducing a civic definition of the state preclude it from 
being considered pluralistic or participatory.93  
On transparency and accountability of governance, the Slovak constitution 
written after independence did establish genuine democratic institutions. It 
implemented a parliamentary system of government comprising one chamber, a non-
executive president elected by parliament, and an independent Constitutional Court. 
Still, Slovakia under Mečiar was characterized by clientelism and concentration of 
political power, with ministerial and national bureaucratic positions filled with friends 
and supporters. Political control extended over the police, intelligence services, 
prosecutors, and some judges.94 Repeated conflicts between Mečiar and President 
Michal Kováč contributed to instability. Mečiar sought numerous times to have Kováč 
removed from office, but was never able to achieve the three-fifths parliamentary 
mandate required to do so. In intervening effectively in these repeated conflicts, 
though, the Constitutional Court proved itself a force for democratic preservation.  
Similar tactics characterized Mečiar’s approach to privatization. After returning 
to power in the 1994 parliamentary elections, the Mečiar government cancelled the 
voucher scheme and formed a National Property Fund outside of parliamentary 
oversight to manage privatization.95 It proceeded to sell off companies valued at a 
reported 20 billion koruny while collecting only 3 billion koruny for the public coffers. 
Significantly, particularly in contrast to the other cases, the Slovak economy performed 
reasonably well under Mečiar, despite the troubled political climate. While 
nevertheless managing to delay real economic reform, it recovered from the initial 
drop in output experienced everywhere and attracted some foreign investment over 
the decade.96 
Concerning civil liberties, the government’s treatment of minorities gave rise to 
numerous human rights concerns.97 The government strongly influenced state-owned 
media, and attacks on journalists critical of the government were not uncommon in 
Bratislava.98 The Prime Minister’s most excessive stunt by far was his alleged 
involvement in the kidnapping of the President’s adult son and the firebombing of the 
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car of the main inspector investigating the incident.99 Public dissent was largely 
tolerated, as the President successfully vetoed attempts to amend the law to 
criminalize public rallies or organized protest.100 An independent civil society was able 
to develop in Slovakia as NGOs took root in the country and trade unions took on a 
political role.101  
As Bútora and Bútorová summarize, the upshot of Mečiar’s rule was the 
exacerbation of political polarization in the country; the politicization of the state 
administration; the labeling of government critics as “enemies,” “anti-Slovaks” or “anti-
state” elements; the exclusion of the opposition from oversight of government 
institutions, publicly owned media, and the privatization process; discrimination 
against ethnic Hungarians; and suspicions about ties between state officials and 
organized crime.102 On the other hand, although the Office of the Prime Minister 
demonstrated clear authoritarian tendencies and behaviors, fledgling democratic 
institutions were successful in deflecting more egregious violations of the rule of law. 
In addition, the Mečiar regime lasted 5 years, in contrast to the decade of 
postcommunist authoritarianism experienced in Croatia and Serbia. On a relative 
scale, the Mečiar years therefore might be expected to produce mild to moderate 
postcommunist authoritarian legacies. 
5.2. Croatia, 1991-2000 
 In Croatia, Franjo Tudjman led the country to independence in 1991, having 
become president after his Croatian Democratic Union’s (HDZ) decisive win in the first 
postcommunist multi-party elections held in the federation of Yugoslavia in 1990. 
Tudjman presided over a semi-authoritarianism that was even more nationalist in 
character than Slovakia’s. The violent breakup of Yugoslavia implicated Croatia in 
ongoing nationalist conflicts and war, where it was both the victim of Serbian 
aggression and an aggressor in Bosnia.103 To maintain its focus on authoritarianism, 
this paper does not discuss the Yugoslav wars in detail. Nevertheless, this period of 
postcommunist politics in Croatia was defined by nationalism and war. This cannot be 
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overlooked because, as Ottoway puts it, both “were instrumental in fostering semi-
authoritarianism.”104 
By all accounts, and in contrast to Serbia’s Milošević, Tudjman was a true 
nationalist believer and his HDZ more a movement than a political party.105 It rose to 
power with strong popular support, though Tudjman did not hesitate to exploit his 
status as a “father of the nation” figure amid the nationalist, anticommunist sentiment 
and war situation in the country.106 Once in office, he took no chances, manipulating 
the electoral process and establishing pervasive control over all institutions.107 
Freedom House ranked the regime a 4 on Political Rights and a 4 on Civil Liberties for 
almost its entire tenure in office.  
On political rights, Tudjman too tried to uphold a façade of democracy, though 
he apparently had fewer reservations about manipulating elections. Among other 
tricks, he timed elections to capitalize on favorable military events, gerrymandered 
districts, and reserved special parliamentary seats for the pro-HDZ diaspora.108 He 
also engaged in outright electoral fraud: When opponents captured Zagreb in 
municipal elections in 1995, the president imposed his own nominee, refusing to allow 
a mayor who would oppose his policies to govern the capital.109 Presidential elections 
held in June 1997 were assessed “free, but not fair” by international observers.110 
Croatia’s semi-presidential system provides for a unicameral parliament and 
Supreme Court. Under Tudjman, however, these institutions were denied any 
independence: through strong-arm tactics, cronyism, and intimidation, they were 
effectively made extensions of the party. Tudjman’s constitutional power to legislate by 
decree, though intended only for emergencies, “became an almost routine way of 
governing.”111 The military, intelligence and security services did not function as 
professional agencies, but rather as instruments of the ruling party.112 The flagrant 
abuses on political rights measures resulted in “the over-concentration of executive 
power in Tudjman’s hands, the dominance of his party (HDZ) in the state, including 
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the judiciary, and political use of security services and indirect censorship of the 
press.”113  
Similarly, the privatization process in Croatia was conducted according to 
Tudjman’s vision of Croatia as a “statelet that would be ruled by 100 rich families.”114 
The process resulted in ninety-seven percent of socially owned firms being privatized 
corruptly through the Croatian Privatization Fund to persons with close ties to the 
HDZ.115  
Tudjman also went to great lengths to stifle civil liberties and freedom of 
expression. He retained complete control of the national news agency, as well as state 
television and radio, used the privatization process to ensure friendly ownership of 
non-government media, and even used the banks to ensure that only HDZ loyalists 
would be given credit to buy press outlets.116 The government did not censor openly, 
but effectively controlled the press through these and other means. Libel laws were a 
favored tool, with around 700 libel suits on record for the period 1994 to 1997.117  
Tudjman’s government also established regulatory oversight over NGOs and 
denounced the many human rights groups operating in the post-war environment as 
”anti-national.”118 In addition, human rights concerns played an increasingly visible role 
in criticisms of the regime by outside observers. By 1997, for example, the US pointed 
to attacks on Serbs returning home as well as Tudjman’s racist public statements.119  
Thus, when Tudjman died of cancer in December 1999, the country had been 
subjected to effectively a decade of semi-authoritarianism. When contrasted with 
Slovakia, it was clearly a harsher authoritarianism. Its involvement in conflict and war 
crimes has not been elaborated here; these involvements can only be hypothesized to 
exacerbate the legacies of authoritarianism. In sum, the legacies of the Tudjman 
regime can be expected to be moderate to strong.  
5.3. Serbia, 1990-2000 
Finally, Serbia was characterized throughout the 1990s by extreme nationalism, 
violence, and war. Slobodan Milošević, described as the “prototype ‘nomenklatura 
nationalist’, a former communist bureaucrat who turned to nationalism once the 
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bankruptcy of communist ideology had been exposed,”120 led the country into a series 
of destructive wars, the consequences of which included international isolation, 
economic collapse, and a NATO bombing campaign waged against it in 1999. 
Milošević mobilized exclusionary nationalism to concentrate power and deflect 
reforms. Though it, too, was a hybrid, semi-authoritarian regime, its consistent scores 
of 6 and 6 on the Political Rights and Civil Liberties indices earned it the classification 
of “not free.” The most telling difference between Serbia and the other cases 
examined here was the regime’s willingness to use force against its people. Still, it 
never took on the appearance of full-blown dictatorship.121 
The defining characteristics of postcommunist authoritarianism in Serbia 
included “mass mobilization through fervent nationalism, the use of mythical, 
historical, and political symbols to prevent political change, control of media outlets, 
the reliance on force (including police, the Ministry of the Interior, and army) to repress 
opponents of the regime, the stifling of economic reform, and the creation of constant 
crises to keep the population loyal.”122  
Specifically, on political rights measures, numerous independent political 
organizations were allowed to exist, but the regime recognized few limits when it came 
to manipulating elections or otherwise preventing competition. Gerrymandering, ballot 
tampering, and failure to recognize opposition victories in several cities in 1996 
elections produced months of mass rallies in Belgrade.123 The opposition remained 
largely fragmented; personality clashes dominated and made the opposition parties 
unpopular throughout the 1990s.124 Additionally, Serbia was the only one of the three 
countries in which the president outright stole a national election – the presidential 
election of September 2000, which led to a protracted standoff with masses of 
challengers and eventually deposed him.  
Like Croatia, the semi-presidential system in Serbia reserved sweeping powers 
for the president, elected by direct popular vote. Patronage networks ensured a high 
degree of party control over the state apparatus and effectively denied any separation 
of powers.125 Milošević also violated the constitution “as he saw fit.”126 In addition to 
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the power base in the military forces and state apparatus, an important center of 
power lay with Milošević and his wife, Mirjana Marković, whose “family and circle of 
friends acted like a mafia group in the economy.”127 Unlike the other countries, which – 
however corruptly – initiated market reforms, Serbia was still a socialist economy 
when it began its second transition. The isolation and destruction of infrastructure 
during the wars erased the economic advantage Western-looking Yugoslavia had held 
under communism, and the economy collapsed.128 Under conditions of war and 
sanctions, those who could manipulate shortages and dominate the black market 
wielded significant power.129 Oligarchic cliques operating around Milošević and his 
wife dominated political and economic institutions alike.130 
As noted above, the Milošević regime was even more repressive on civil 
liberties than the other two cases examined, most significantly with respect to the use 
of violence. According to Geoffrey Pridham’s account, Milošević’s favored means of 
dealing with dissidents was contract killing.131 He occasionally shut down media 
outlets and ordered the assassination of critical journalists.132 As Vjeran Pavlaković 
observes, the level of repression increased in periods in which the government came 
under direct threat, such as during the protests against electoral fraud in 1996/97 or 
the NATO bombing campaign in 1999. “Media blackouts, censorship, arbitrary arrests, 
intimidation of leading members of opposition movements, and threats to use 
unrestrained force” characterized these periods.133 Still, what is striking about Serbia 
is that pockets of independent opinion and media did survive. Outbreaks of public 
protest were common, especially in Belgrade, where Milošević had never been 
popular.134 
 Appreciably more violent and repressive, the Milošević regime was clearly the 
most authoritarian of the three considered. After losing four wars in a decade, it was a 
pariah regime.135 An important contrast to the other cases is that Milošević 
successfully deflected the introduction of market reforms in the 1990s, enabling him 
the platform of the socialist (and shadow) economies to further consolidate his power. 
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Rather than legacies of partial reforms, reformers thus would directly inherit the 
legacies of central planning, although Yugoslavia’s unique system of social ownership 
by all accounts had been one of the more efficient in the communist bloc.136 This 
would suggest that the part of the argument regarding the legacies of flawed 
privatization does not apply to Serbia. Nevertheless, I would argue that the conditions 
of the war economy provided ample opportunity for the same type of arbitrage and 
rent-seeking activities that created the reform dynamics that Hellman observed in 
transition economies.137 All in all, the legacies of postcommunist authoritarianism 
under Milošević are likely to be strong. 
6. The European Union and Second Transition Developments 
 The discussion above has established clear variation among the 
postcommunist authoritarian regimes and the corresponding legacies they produced. 
This section evaluates the receptiveness of the international environment that greeted 
each country’s second transition. As argued above, the most important aspect of 
international support in this context is the EU accession process. The most significant 
aspect of the accession process for countries undergoing a second transition is, in 
turn, the presence of a credible EU membership perspective.  
6.1. Slovakia 
As Slovakia emerged from Mečiarism, it had a very strong EU membership 
perspective. In the early 1990s, the EU had signed Association Agreements with ten 
Central and East European countries and, at Copenhagen in 1993, determined that 
“the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become 
members of the Union.”138 Slovakia was included in this group, and it submitted a 
formal application for membership in 1995. But when the Luxembourg European 
Council of December 1997 elected to open accession negotiations with those it 
deemed ready, Slovakia was pointedly left out. These events had the significance of 
making clear that Slovakia was squandering an opportunity. Moreover, in formally 
applying for membership, Slovakia had submitted itself to the official process of 
evaluation on its suitability for membership. The monitoring reports issued regularly by 
the EU cited the shortcomings of its illiberal government and pointed clearly to what 
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needed to be done instead.139 At the time of the second transition, leaders were 
assured of Slovakia’s future place in the EU and knew what they had to do to turn 
around its membership prospects. The presence of the EU as a force for consolidation 
in Slovakia’s second transition could therefore be considered strong.  
6.2. Croatia and Serbia 
For the Balkan countries, where the EU was not as deeply engaged in the 
1990s and where its involvement began in earnest in the form of peacekeeping after 
the destructive wars, there was a lesser perspective for EU accession. But with the 
establishment of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), the EU officially 
recognized that Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia & 
Montenegro could eventually become full members of the EU. The European Council 
in Feira in June 2000 confirmed the EU’s objective of integrating the Western Balkans 
into the mainstream of Europe and announced that “all the countries concerned are 
potential candidates for EU membership.”140   
By the end of the 1990s, the priorities of peace and stability in the region had 
led the EU to consider how its accession process could contribute to achieving those 
goals. To that end, it reaffirmed membership prospects for the Western Balkan 
countries, but also added several additional steps to the front end of its negotiations 
with those countries. The countries of the Western Balkans now require as a first step 
a Feasibility Study; this determines whether a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement can be opened, which then serves as the legal and institutional framework 
guiding the country’s pre-accession process.141 This instrument is similar to the 
Europe Agreements signed with Central European countries in the early 1990s, but 
the Stabilization and Association Process introduces additional conditionality by 
requiring cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).  
Thus, after Tudjman’s death and the HDZ party’s defeat in Croatia and 
Milošević’s ouster in Serbia, both countries had reasonable incentive from the EU to 
pursue and remain on the path of democratic reform. With the additional step of a 
Stability and Association Agreement required, it cannot be argued that Croatia and 
Serbia enjoyed the same membership perspective that Slovakia did. The road is now 
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longer, which can be argued to reduce the strength of the incentive because the 
reward is less immediate. But the prospects of membership were equal to each other 
at the outset of their second transitions. Both had been explicitly acknowledged as 
part of Europe and as having a future place in the European Union. The level of 
incentive from the EU in both transitions could therefore be considered moderate. 
7. Second Transitions, Second Chances? The Current State of Play 
The preceding sections have studied the decidedly non-democratic regimes 
that initial transitions from communism produced. Having assessed the factors in the 
international and domestic environments each can be expected to have to contend 
with upon extricating itself from illiberal rule, this section examines how the three 
countries have fared the second time around. The information presented here is 
intended to provide a basis for discussion in the next section, where the divergent 
outcomes will be accounted for in terms of the differences in leverage and legacies 
outlined above. 
It is worth reasserting here that the democratic gains being measured are 
relative. Everywhere that a second transition has occurred, the overall trend has been 
positive. Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia are all much more democratic places than they 
were under Mečiar, Tudjman, and Milošević, respectively. The differences between 
them lie in how extensive their gains have been, that is, how significantly the quality of 
democratic governance has improved. Each country’s performance in the areas of 
political rights and civil liberties since its second transition is presented in Table 2 
below. The mere arrival of a democratic government accounts for the across the board 
improvement shown in each case. Viewed over time, however, the scores make clear 
that the countries have not equally maintained that momentum, nor have additional 
gains been achieved in all cases. In the simplest terms, Slovakia’s democratic gains 
have been strong, Croatia’s moderate, and Serbia’s weak. 
Table 2. Political Rights and Civil Liberties since Second Transitions 
Country  
[Breakthrough] 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Slovakia 
[Sept/1998] 
PR 
CL 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Croatia PR … 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
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[Jan/2000] CL … 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Serbia 
[Oct/2000] 
PR 
CL 
… 
… 
… 
… 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World, Historical Rankings 1973-2006 
The best means of comparing the progress the three have demonstrated is to 
look at the outcomes an equal number of years into each country’s transition. Six 
years after its new government took over, Slovakia received scores of 1 and 1, Croatia 
scored 2 and 2, and Serbia scored 3 and 2. The scores in the table also reflect the fact 
that each of the countries began at a different starting point. In its last full year of semi-
authoritarian rule, Slovakia received scores of 2 and 4 on political rights and civil 
liberties, respectively; Croatia scored 4 and 4; and Serbia 5 and 5 (though in 1999 this 
was already a grade higher than the consecutive 6’s it had received in the years prior). 
Accordingly, Serbia not only had the strongest postcommunist authoritarian regime 
legacies holding back its progress, it also had the farthest to come.  
The cumulative gains also vary, though these are of secondary importance 
since the differences in scores remain so stark. Serbia’s improvement from a 6 to a 3 
on political rights is a net 3-point gain, but its score remains a 3, suggesting that real 
deficiencies remain. Croatia’s movement from a 4 to a 2 gives it a smaller net gain of 2 
points but means it has corrected serious flaws. The most time may have passed 
since Slovakia’s breakthrough, but it is still the only one of the three to achieve a score 
of 1 on either measure. It has done so on both. To a lesser degree, there is also 
interesting variance with respect to how quickly democratic gains have been realized. 
Slovakia’s have been rapid in addition to being the most complete, while Croatia and 
Serbia have not shown improvement on either score in the last five years. The 
following briefly describes the major democratic developments in each of the three 
countries since their second transitions began. 
7.1. Slovakia 
In Slovakia, the center-right Dzurinda government that formed after the 1998 
elections moved quickly and credibly to implement political and market reforms. It 
actively sought to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic community and successfully 
concluded bids to join the EU and NATO. These accomplishments can be viewed as a 
reflection of the maturity of Slovak political culture, as they came about despite the 
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broad coalition’s different policy priorities and significant ideological differences.142 
International observers frequently pointed to bickering among the coalition parties, 
which were united only in their pro-democracy orientation and disagreed on much 
else. The next parliamentary elections were held in September 2002, and the results 
yielded a second government under Dzurinda. Notably, Dzurinda was the first reform 
leader in any postcommunist country to serve a second term. Conflict over economic 
reforms led this four-party coalition to collapse in 2005.  
Early elections held in June 2006 returned Mečiar’s old party and another 
nationalist party to government as junior coalition partners. This development is a bit 
disconcerting, but thus far has not given any indication that it will reverse the 
democratic gains made between 1998 and 2006. Consistent with the ‘two-turnover 
test’ sometimes considered a measure of democratic consolidation, Freedom House 
judged that the smooth conduct of the 2006 elections confirmed overall stability and 
the consolidated condition of democracy. Despite Slovakia’s scores of 1 and 1 on 
political rights and civil liberties, Freedom House still cites some shortcomings, 
particularly in the fight against corruption and with regard to political interference in the 
media.143 
7.2. Croatia 
 Following the election of Stjepan Mesić as President in January 2000 and the 
victory of a center-left coalition in parliamentary elections later that month, Croatia also 
showed improvement in the areas of democracy and rule of law. The European 
Commission commented that “the new Croatian leadership immediately showed 
determination to entrench democratic values and principles and made rapid and 
significant progress on the main political outstanding questions.”144 A notable early 
step was the introduction of constitutional changes in 2000 and 2001 that established 
a parliamentary system of government and reshaped the balance of power to give the 
parliament and prime minister more authority.145  
The next parliamentary elections were held in 2003 and were also deemed free 
and fair. These witnessed the return to power of the HDZ, albeit under new leadership. 
The HDZ is now viewed as a successfully reformed nationalist party, although some 
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controversial figures remain in positions of influence.146 The functioning of institutions 
and the role of the opposition are assessed as “normal.”147 There is now a cross-party 
consensus in the country favoring European integration, and the HDZ government has 
been actively working to meet the conditions required for EU accession.  
 Croatia currently ranks at 2 and 2 on political rights and civil liberties. Problems 
persist mainly in the areas of refugee return, protection of minority rights, 
independence of the judiciary, and corruption. Freedom House notes that “a nexus of 
official security institutions and ‘legitimate’ businesspeople” is often at the center of 
corruption cases.148 The issue of war crimes also remains a prickly subject, with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) first expressing 
satisfaction with Croatia’s cooperation in April 2004. In an especially positive 
development, Ante Gotovina, Croatia’s highest-ranking war crimes fugitive, was 
arrested and sent to The Hague in December 2005. 
7.3. Serbia 
 In Serbia, the political situation has improved since Milošević’s departure but 
nevertheless has had a few messy incidents, most pointedly the 2003 assassination of 
reform-minded Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic by organized crime figures associated 
with the Milošević-era security services.149 Among other decisive actions, Djindjic had 
previously had Milošević arrested and sent to The Hague.150 After his assassination, 
reforms stalled as the opposition fragmented and lost momentum. Elections in 2003 
stabilized the unwieldy 18-party coalition that had governed since 2000 and brought 
moderate nationalist Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica to power.151 Troublingly, the 
nationalist Serbian Radical Party won the most seats in the 2003 elections, although it 
was prevented from forming a government by a collection of reform parties. Freedom 
House describes the polity as “precariously divided between the 50-55 percent 
majority of the electorate that supports parties that overthrew Milošević in 2000 and 
the 35-45 percent segment that supports [the nationalist parties].”152 According to Judy 
Batt, “Serbia’s democratic parties are deeply divided among themselves, chronically 
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prone to political infighting, and have lost much credibility with the voters.”153 
Strikingly, less than half of the public agrees with the statement that “Democracy is 
better than all other forms of government.”154 
Reform of the 1990 constitution stood on the agenda for a long time before 
revisions were finally adopted in October 2006. The European Commission called this 
a “welcome development,” noting its provisions on major issues such as human rights, 
protection of minorities, and civilian control of the military, which should eliminate 
some of the links between organized crime and the security services.155 Full 
cooperation with the ICTY has not yet been forthcoming, and Serbia’s failure to 
apprehend war crimes suspect Ratko Mladić represents a major obstacle to enhanced 
cooperation with the European Union as well as to improved relations with the United 
States. Another ongoing problem is corruption, which remains at very high levels.156 
Serbia currently scores a 3 on political rights and a 2 on civil liberties. Its list of areas 
where improvement is needed is correspondingly longer: cooperation with the ICTY, 
constitutional issues, the functioning of democratic institutions, public administration 
reform and the development of administrative capacity, judicial reform and the fight 
against organized crime and corruption.157 
8. Connecting the Past with the Present: Leverage and Legacies 
 This study theorized that the leverage of the European Union will have a 
positive impact on democratic gains in second transitions, while the legacies of 
postcommunist authoritarian rule will exert a countervailing negative influence. The 
best that can be achieved through empirical observation is a test of the correlation 
between the variables and the differences in outcome. It is not possible to establish 
causality, even though the mechanisms through which each factor is expected to work 
have been explained in depth. The argument’s merits can only be assessed on the 
basis of correlation and plausibility.  
The cases explored here confirm the general trends expected. The strength of 
the EU’s presence as an actor for the most part correlates positively with democratic 
gains, while the strength of the postcommunist authoritarian regime correlates 
negatively with them. Also as expected, the correlation is stronger on the legacies 
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variable than on leverage. The next sections explore these correlations in greater 
depth.  
8.1. The Role of Leverage 
 Democratic gains in second transitions have been most complete where the 
EU’s leverage is greatest (Slovakia). Where leverage is only moderate, a broader 
range of outcomes has been possible (compare Croatia and Serbia). Considering the 
membership perspective available to Serbia in 2000 alone would have predicted 
stronger progress than that which it has actually shown. Consequently, the hypothesis 
that the incentive of EU membership enhances democratic gains in second transitions 
falls a bit short. The divergence between the Croatian and Serbian cases instead 
makes clear that the incentive the EU provides for reform does not operate uniformly 
across cases. 
8.1.1. Dynamic Interaction  
 For methodological reasons and to facilitate comparison, this study sought to 
capture the credibility of an EU membership perspective for each country at the critical 
moment when its second transition began. This also effectively isolated the influence 
stemming from the EU’s side. Tracing the development of relations with the EU since 
the start of each country’s second transition illustrates the interaction between 
conditionality and domestic behavior noted in the theoretical framework above.  
 The three countries’ relationships with the EU have developed quite differently 
over the course of their respective second transitions. Looking at the state of relations 
in the spring of 2007, Slovakia has been an EU member for three years, Croatia has 
completed a Stabilization and Association Agreement and is now a candidate for 
membership, and Serbia has just recently been approved to resume negotiations on 
an SAA. As I have emphasized throughout, these very different outcomes reflect 
equally the countries’ prospects vis-à-vis EU membership and their own policies and 
choices.  
The Dzurinda government in Slovakia made joining the European Union its top 
priority and immediately began implementing the outstanding reforms. Just a little 
more than a year after Mečiar’s defeat, the 1999 Helsinki European Council moved to 
open negotiations with Slovakia. Membership negotiations began in 2000 and were 
concluded in 2002 – the fastest any country has completed the process. Slovakia 
joined the EU together with its Central European neighbors in 2004.  
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Croatia has also enjoyed positive reinforcement for its efforts from the EU, 
where the Commission emphasizes that the rapid development of relations has been 
a reflection of Croatia’s commitment to meeting its requirements.158 In May 2000, the 
Commission adopted a Feasibility Report clearing the way for the negotiation of a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement. This was signed in October 2001, less than 
2 years into Croatia’s second transition. It formally applied for membership in 2003, 
and the Brussels European Council in June 2004 affirmed its status as a candidate 
country. Membership talks were opened in October 2005, once it had been 
established that Croatia was cooperating fully with the ICTY. Croatia’s advancement 
through the EU process has been slower than Slovakia’s for the simple reason that its 
cooperation has been less complete.  
For Serbia, the path has been even less smooth. The EU first positively 
assessed its progress with a Feasibility Report in April 2005, and negotiations on a 
Stabilization and Association Agreement began in October 2005 with initially 
substantial progress.159 Due to Serbia’s failure to cooperate sufficiently with the ICTY, 
negotiations were suspended in 2006, with the EU signaling its readiness to resume 
them once Serbia cooperated fully on the war crimes issue. As of June 1, 2007, 
Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn had just confirmed that negotiations on an 
SAA could be resumed, but a date had not been set.160  
To a clear extent, the differences in EU relations parallel differences in the level 
of democratic gains each country has attained. Accounting for the dynamics of the EU 
variable in this study would have meant presenting a circular argument in which the 
dependent variable (democratic gains) in part determines the strength of the 
independent variable. Measuring the role of leverage at just a single point in time – 
before this interaction began – has allowed me to avoid this, although in doing so I 
may have compromised some ability to observe the mechanics of the EU’s influence. 
For example, many studies suggest that the EU’s leverage is strongest during the 
negotiations phase, that is, when the rewards it offers are most immediate.161 I have 
instead discussed broadly the ‘gravitational pull’ of EU membership prospects on the 
countries on its periphery.  
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8.1.2. Setting Up for Second Transitions  
Another factor that perhaps has not been sufficiently captured in this analysis is 
the role of the European Union during the years of postcommunist authoritarian rule. A 
major difference between Slovakia and the other cases is the level of engagement it 
continued to enjoy with the West during its illiberal phase. Slovakia’s emerging NGO 
community benefited from Western assistance and ties, and the government 
bureaucracy was engaged with technocrats in Brussels.162 The government received 
multiple official warnings about its democratic deficiencies, though these had minimal 
impact on Mečiar’s behavior.163 It is clear that EU leverage could have only a limited 
effect as long as those in office were unwilling to meet its conditions.  
What is less clear is how the EU’s presence in those years affected second 
transition developments. I have hypothesized that contact with the EU or other outside 
actors during postcommunist authoritarianism served primarily to communicate the 
message that the country was falling behind, and my analysis has supported this idea. 
Vachudova argues that the EU’s greatest impact in those years was on “the 
configuration, the strength, and the agenda of the opposition forces competing against 
illiberal political parties.”164 It is certainly plausible that links with the EU played a 
larger role in bringing about second transitions than has been acknowledged here. 
However, if the role of the EU under postcommunist authoritarian rule has been 
understated in this paper, it is only with respect to Slovakia and, to a lesser extent, 
Croatia. Serbia, which had been embargoed and bombed, was extremely isolated 
under Milošević. The EU could not be argued to have played a role in setting up 
second transition developments there, though many Western actors actively 
encouraged Milošević’s overthrow. Croatia had also been shunned for its involvement 
in hostilities and ethnic cleansing, but depending on the West’s shifting priorities, was 
variably courted as part of a solution to the Milošević problem.165 It developed some 
ties to outside actors, and its opposition adopted links to European parties.166 These 
may have had a similar effect in helping the opposition organize, though they suggest 
a minor influence at best. 
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8.1.3. Channels of Influence  
So how does leverage matter? As in the initially successful transitions from 
communism, the EU’s most important impact comes in the consolidation phase of 
second transitions. The pre-accession process provides the second transition winners 
with a clear agenda of political reforms that need to be undertaken; these correspond 
to the requirements of a system that is democratic in substance as well as in form. 
The EU accession process also provides a framework for holding reformers to their 
word. For Vachudova, EU leverage has been “decisive in shaping the political and 
economic agendas of the opposition parties that came to power – and ensuring that 
these agendas were carried out.”167  
In the cases of Slovakia and Croatia, it can be observed that the goal of EU 
accession provided a “focal point for cooperation”168 that helped the large and 
ideologically diverse coalitions that took power in second transitions organize their 
efforts. Haughton observes that outside supporters of Slovakia’s membership bid 
intervened to avert a near crisis of the governing coalition in 2001.169 In Croatia, the 
formerly illiberal HDZ now even openly supports EU integration and in government 
has worked to implement the acquis. It follows that as EU integration becomes the 
‘only game in town,’ so too does democracy. It is this process of forming a consensus 
in favor of EU integration and attracting the illiberal (or nationalist) parties to it that is 
visibly stalled in Serbia.170 
This analysis has struggled to attach specific importance to EU leverage in 
explaining second transition outcomes. But Vachudova makes a compelling argument 
regarding its broader and longer-term impact. As she observes, “We see virtually no 
backsliding as successive governments make progress on political and economic 
reform. They may move forward quickly (Slovakia) or slowly (Serbia), but there have 
been no wholesale reversals of policy, despite electoral turnover.”171 This is due to the 
‘locking-in’ of the reform trajectory and the narrowing of policy options associated with 
it. The current status of democratization in each country can by no means be 
considered a final ‘outcome,’ and if Croatia and Serbia continue on the democracy 
track, the explanatory power of the leverage variable will gain credibility. Over the 
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longer term, we might expect to see a clearer positive correlation between the EU’s 
openness to membership and the consolidation of postcommunist democracies. 
In sum, it is difficult to ascribe significant explanatory power to EU leverage. 
However, this seems to have less to do with the incentives available from the EU side 
than with the individual countries’ responses to them. For clarification, I turn to 
examining the legacies of postcommunist authoritarianism and their impact on 
domestic conditions.  
8.2. The Role of Legacies 
Where the pull of the European Union cannot account for different outcomes, 
the argument of countervailing legacies can. The variation on the legacies variable 
correlates very closely with the observed outcomes. Mild legacies have translated 
more easily into democratic gains (Slovakia), moderate legacies have yielded some to 
allow for moderate gains (Croatia), and strong legacies have corresponded with 
stalled reform (Serbia). The legacies narrative also seems to account for the divergent 
outcomes observed in Croatia and Serbia, two cases equal with respect to the EU 
factor at the start of their transitions. Notably, a number of the specific legacies 
predicted to pose major challenges – including corruption, elite infighting, and illiberal 
political culture as reflected in the embrace of nationalism – have emerged as serious 
issues for reform governments. Others, such as lack of experience with a functioning 
system of checks and balances or even transition fatigue, appear to have been 
overstated.  
8.2.1. Institutional Legacies 
This study has conceptualized a set of legacies specific to the period of 
postcommunist authoritarianism. The first challenge, I argued, would be the difficulty 
reformers would face in establishing new patterns of behavior in democratic 
institutions that had been thoroughly abused by the past regime. In the area of 
institutional legacies, several of the anticipated problems have in fact appeared in 
second transition political developments. Even in the exemplary case of Slovakia, 
problems with corruption and coalition squabbling have persisted. Croatia 
encountered difficulty reforming its judiciary, and there are clear remaining legacies of 
the cronyism that accompanied privatization in the 1990s. Tom Gallagher points out 
that the former ruling party in Serbia and, to a lesser extent, Croatia continues to enjoy 
a strong degree of influence because they have “well-placed allies in both the private 
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and state-run sectors of the economy, in the media, and in the judiciary and security 
services.”172  
As expected, the case of Serbia, with the harshest postcommunist 
authoritarianism and thus the strongest legacies, is the one struggling most today with 
the specific vestiges of fragmented democratic politics, organized crime, and 
constitutional reform, not to mention a severe economic situation. Additionally, in 
Serbia, the dramatic events of Milošević’s removal had the important implication that 
last-minute negotiations accompanying the regime’s exit allowed for the preservation 
of some of its most unsavory elements, such as the security forces who agreed not to 
defend Milošević and thus were allowed to stay.173  
Some institutional legacies have proven more intractable than others. Stripping 
power from the unaccountable groups that accumulated it in the 1990s, among them 
the early winners of privatization, has proven extremely difficult. Corruption is 
perceived to remain both in relation to these groups and in the functioning of public 
administration. Coalitions have trouble cooperating, though this is likely as much a 
product of their unwieldy size than of the fragmented opposition politics of the 1990s. 
On the other hand, the legacies of an overly powerful executive and the absence of 
real checks and balances seem not to have as lasting an impact as predicted. The 
new governments for the most part have been successful in introducing constitutional 
reforms to shift the balance of power, and elites have adapted accordingly.  
8.2.2. Behavioral and Attitudinal Legacies 
I also predicted that the experience of postcommunist authoritarianism would have 
lasting consequences for elites’ and citizens’ attitudes toward democracy. I expected that 
it would stymie the growth of a civil society, weaken citizens’ perceptions of the legitimacy 
of democracy as a system, and in the most extreme cases even encourage illiberalism 
among the populace itself. On these issues, the conclusions of my analysis are more 
mixed, though I would argue this has mostly to do with the fact that they are less visible 
and therefore more difficult to measure. 
I have found no specific evidence of additional damage to civil society under 
postcommunist authoritarianism. This sector even showed surprising capacity in 
mobilizing to overthrow authoritarian regimes in the context of electoral revolutions. The 
postcommunist region as a whole, including initially successful liberal reform cases such 
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as Czech Republic and Hungary, exhibits lasting civil society weakness when compared 
to established democracies as well as in comparison to newer democracies that 
transitioned from military or other forms of authoritarian rule. In accounting for this, Marc 
Morjé Howard points to the legacy of mistrust of communist organizations, the 
persistence of friendship networks, and postcommunist disappointment.174 So far, the 
second transition countries do not demonstrate a clear pattern of their own. Indicators 
such as trust in government and participation are low throughout the region, making it 
difficult to associate these specifically with legacies of postcommunist authoritarianism. 
Either way, distrust is strong, faith in democracy is fragile, and greater disappointment 
threatens to weaken its foundations even further.  
An even larger cause for concern stems from the persistence of non-democratic 
ideologies where the regime engaged most strongly in exploiting ethnic tensions. In both 
Croatia and Serbia, the nationalist issue is alive, with war crimes remaining a sensitive 
issue. Croatia has submitted to cooperating with the ICTY, but the public’s continued 
perception of ‘war heroes’ and the general lack of willingness to address the past 
suggests that insufficient progress has been made in advancing democratic values 
among the general public. Minority rights also remain a problem for Croatia, where the 
Serb minority is treated with hostility.  
In Serbia, the situation is far more extreme, likely because nationalist hostilities 
continued for much longer in Serbia, through the 1999 war in Kosovo, whereas they 
abated after 1995 in Croatia. Moreover, the status of Kosovo remains contentious 
today, stoking the passions of the extreme nationalist parties and easily distracting 
voters from the reform path.175 This is a clear example of a legacy constraining the 
choices even of reformist elites. With the above-mentioned 35-45 percent of the 
population supporting nationalist parties, and given the presence of a flash point in the 
form of Kosovo, Vachudova notes that all parties have shifted to take a bit more of a 
nationalist stance. The result has been that extremists have “little reason to change 
how they get votes, especially since they are also profiting from the tremendous grip 
on the economy of criminal gangs and from the Serb public’s opposition to 
cooperation with the ICTY.”176 The extreme ethnic mobilization and nationalist 
hostilities that occurred under the postcommunist authoritarian regimes and their 
residual effects on the polity are issues that deserve significant attention in their own 
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right. In the cases studied here, these seem to be the most damaging and most 
intractable legacies of postcommunist authoritarian rule. Yet on their own, they really 
should not be. Nationalist mobilization is an elected strategy, and all of the 
postcommunist authoritarians considered here exploited ethnic cleavages for political 
purposes. Nationalist passions reached a height under Tudjman and Milošević that 
was not rivaled in Slovakia, but I contend another reason they have proven more 
difficult to extinguish in the former cases is that other legacies have made it difficult for 
“makeshift ruling coalitions […] to establish their authority over unaccountable power 
centers in the army, police, and intelligence world,” where the illiberal forces continue 
to wield influence.177 
In sum, I find in the legacies narrative a strong explanation for the divergence in 
second transition outcomes. But considering legacies alone would not have 
anticipated the level of gains Serbia has achieved in spite of them and certainly would 
not have predicted the progress Croatia has made. While I have identified some 
legacies that appear to be important, it has been impossible to systematically 
determine which legacies will matter and when.  
9. Conclusion 
In the above, I have sought to draw attention to a unique set of events currently 
underway in postcommunist politics. Second transitions, where they have occurred, 
have produced second chances for a country’s hopes for democracy. But so far, only 
some of these hopes have been fulfilled. My analysis sought to explain why this is the 
case. I studied the impact of EU leverage and postcommunist authoritarian legacies 
on three cases of second transition. My findings moderately support the hypothesis 
that the incentive of membership in the EU promotes democratic gains in transition 
countries. In reality, it more likely reinforces or even accelerates reforms once they are 
underway. Whether or not a country takes advantage of the EU’s incentives and 
offerings to anchor its transition process, however, seems to have much more to do 
with domestic conditions within that country. Here, I have found strong support for the 
argument that specific legacies attributable to postcommunist authoritarian rule hold 
back a country’s democratic progress, even once second transitions have succeeded 
in putting a democratic government in place. The best determinant of how smooth a 
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country’s second transition will be seems to be the strength of the legacies of the past 
regime that it must overcome.  
In this paper, I have presented a plausible explanation for the divergence of 
outcomes observed in Slovakia, Croatia, and Serbia. I also believe this argument 
would hold when applied across a broader set of cases. What remains unclear is how 
long legacies should be expected to play a role. Some may require a generational 
shift, while consistent practice of democratic behaviors might be enough to overcome 
others. Accordingly, longer-term developments are also difficult to predict. When 
viewed over a longer period, the EU’s gravitational pull might take on more 
explanatory power. Aside from identifying a general counterbalancing effect, I have 
not succeeded in determining how leverage and legacies interact.  
Nevertheless, it may be possible to reconcile leverage and legacies in a 
common theoretical framework. Where proponents of the EU explanation ascribe its 
less successful efforts to the reluctance or non-receptiveness of the target state, a 
plausible explanation for this lack of enthusiasm might be found in authoritarian 
legacies. Though they rarely use the term “postcommunist legacies” and seldom treat 
postcommunist transitions as different from other transitions, there is some overlap 
between these perspectives. Similarly, where legacies do not seem to have had as 
lasting an impact as expected, this may be because the EU’s leverage was strong 
enough to neutralize them, though there is less support for this idea in the case 
studies. What is clear is that any credible explanation must account sufficiently for 
both international and domestic factors and the relationship between them. 
To this end, the legacies theory is certainly worthy of additional exploration. 
Further research should seek to determine systematically which legacies matter, how 
and when they fade on their own (if they do), and how transition leaders and their 
external supporters can fight them. It would be fatalistic to conclude that legacies 
determine a regime’s trajectory, and that is not what I have tried to do here. Such an 
argument would also not be very persuasive, since legacy arguments do not account 
at all for how change does come about. Instead, I have attempted to highlight a 
specific set of challenges that are unique to reform governments undergoing second 
transitions. Seeing the damage postcommunist authoritarian legacies inflict on second 
transition processes, there is no room for complacency or the assumption that 
legacies will dissipate on their own. The distinctive challenges facing second 
transitions need to be recognized as such, and the support directed to these new 
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democracies should be tailored to combat the legacies of postcommunist 
authoritarianism and ensure that more second transitions realize their second 
chances.  
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